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Abstract 
In this study we provide evidence of cross-sectional dependence of bidder-
shareholder wealth and target’s board characteristics. More specifically we 
provide evidence that the percentage of non-executives, the board size, the stock 
holdings of executives, and the other directorships held by non-executives 
serving the target board are important in assessing the announcement of the bid, 
whereas in the bidder’s board only the percentage of non-executive directors is 
important for bidder-shareholders. In addition to that we provide evidence that 
some of these relationships are not monotonic in nature. Finally, in this study it 
is documented that bidder-shareholder wealth is favoured in acquisitions where 
bidders have marginally more executive than non-executive directors in their 
boards and therefore the question arises as to whether “dependent” boards are 
more efficient than “independent” ones. 
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The Effect of Board Structure on Bidder-shareholders’ Wealth: Further 
Evidence from the UK Bidding Firms 
 
Corporate Governance is an issue that has seen a lot of public debate over the 
past few years. In the UK several committees have been set-up in order to deal 
with this issue producing several interesting reports, e.g. the Cadbury Report 
(1992), the Greenbury Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1998), and the Higgs 
Report (2003). The Cadbury committee, in 1992, reviewed the structure and 
responsibilities of boards of directors in the UK and has summarised their 
recommendations in a Code of Best Practice. In 1995 the Greenbury committee 
issued an accompanying code in order to set out best practice in determining 
and accounting for the remuneration of directors. Finally in 1998 the Hampel 
and in 2003 the Higg’s reports commented on matters on which the committees 
took a different view from the previous committees, or which the Cadbury and 
Greenbury committees did not deal with at all. All four reports share a common 
view: the prime responsibility of the board of directors should be to determine 
the broad strategy of the company and to ensure its implementation. As Ezzamel 
and Watson (1997) put it: “The central legal responsibilities of the UK’s 
‘unitary
1’ boards of directors are fairly clear, namely to manage the business 
collectively in accordance with its constitution for the benefit of its shareholders 
and to comply with the financial reporting and other disclosure requirements 
stipulated by company law”. For UK companies then, the board of directors 
fulfils two main functions. It is responsible for protecting the interests of the 
shareholders, having at the same time the legal authority to formulate and 
implement business activities in a manner that complies with company law and 
other regulations. 
 
Since corporate strategies of a firm are formulated and implemented by the 
board of directors it is probable that the characteristics of the board are directly 
associated with the outcome of its decision. One of the major corporate 
strategies that a firm might be involved in is the takeover of another company. 
Previous research supports the view that, because of its importance, bidder-
shareholders react abnormally at the announcement of such an investment 
affecting share prices and therefore shareholder wealth. The motivation for this 
study is that board structure, of both bidder and target, might be important in 
explaining this abnormal behaviour at the announcement of a takeover. Several 
studies have tested this hypothesis, namely whether board structure is associated 
with the outcome of the takeover. The common practice is to test whether board 
characteristics of the bidder can explain changes in bidder-shareholder wealth 
(abnormal returns) or whether board characteristics of the target can explain 
changes in target-shareholder wealth (abnormal returns or bid premium) during   2
the takeover process. It is interesting however that the cross-reaction effect 
between boards and shareholders of the two companies involved in the takeover 
is often neglected. In this study we measure the bidder-shareholders’ wealth 
effect of 185 UK tender offers, announced during the period 1990-1997, and we 
try to identify whether the board composition of bidding and targeted companies 
can explain this effect. The novelties of this study are the cross-sectional 
examination of the target’s board characteristics (in addition to the bidder’s 
board characteristics) on bidder-shareholder wealth during the announcement of 
the bid and also the questionability of the linear relationship, often suggested by 
researchers, between board characteristics and shareholder wealth. In this 
analysis we examine four major board characteristics for both bidders and 
targets: (1) the percentage of non-executive directors (board composition), (2) 
the size of the board, (3) the stock ownership of directors (ordinary shares), and 
(4) the number of other directorships held by non-executive directors in addition 
to the seat held in the bidding or targeted company board. The reason for 
investigating only these four characteristics is very simple: they are publicly 
available and easily accessible by shareholders. We provide evidence that, for 
bidder-shareholders, only the percentage of non-executives in the bidder’s board 
is important in assessing the announcement of the bid, whereas in the target’s 
board they also consider the board size, the executives’ ownership, and other 
directorships held by non-executives. In addition to that we provide evidence 
that some of these characteristics are related to the bidder-shareholder wealth in 
a non-monotonic way. These results emphasise the importance that bidder-
shareholders assign on the cross-sectional impact of their wealth with the 
target’s board characteristics and therefore the importance of corporate 
governance structure during these events. 
 
This paper is organised as follows: in section I we provide the theoretical 
framework along with the underlying hypotheses that are tested throughout the 
analysis. Descriptive statistics of the data and the methodological approach of 
calculating abnormal returns are provided in section II. Section III provides our 
empirical findings and finally, in section IV we present our conclusions. 
 
 
I. Framework and Hypotheses 
A. Abnormal Returns 
A common way to test for the impact of board structure (or any other variable) 
on shareholders’ wealth is to regress the abnormal or cumulative abnormal 
returns around the time period of interest on the various board characteristics 
(internalisation theory for mergers). Therefore it is important to know what 
effect (if there is any) an acquisition announcement has on bidder-shareholder   3
returns. Recent and earlier work for the UK takeovers has shown that on 
average the wealth effects of bidder-shareholders range from value-reduction to 
value-neutral during the acquisition period. Studies by Frank, Broyles, and 
Hecht (1977), Higson and Elliot (1993) and Limmack (1991) on UK domestic 
acquisitions show that shareholders of the acquiring companies gain zero or 
statistically insignificant positive abnormal returns during the announcement 
period. Studies from Firth (1980), Higson and Elliot (1993), and Sudarsanam, 
Holl, and Salami (1996) show that bidder-shareholders experience statistically 
significant negative abnormal returns ranging from -4.02 percent to -6.3 percent 
during the announcement of a takeover. On the other hand studies from Frank 
and Harris (1989), and Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2001) show that 
bidder-shareholders experience significant gains of +2.4 and +1.22 percent 
respectively over the announcement period. Although the evidence is mixed as 
to its magnitude, there is enough evidence that bidder-shareholder wealth is 
affected by takeover announcements, which reinforces the need to identify the 
sources of this effect.  
 
B. Board Characteristics 
As already mentioned, in our analysis we consider four characteristics of the 
board which are easily accessible by any shareholder: the composition of the 
board (percentage of non-executives), the directors’ stock ownership, the 
additional directorships held by non-executive directors, and board size. 
 
B.1. Board Composition 
Usually, corporate boards in the UK include some of the firm’s top managers as 
well as directors from outside the firm. Therefore board in the UK is unitary in 
structure and has a mixture of executive (inside) and non-executive (outside) 
directors. Executive directors who are also employees (usually full-time) of the 
company provide the board with valuable information about the firm’s 
activities. Non-executive directors on the other hand tend to be more involved in 
planning and policy-making. According to Cosh and Hughes (1997) non-
executives are mainly drawn from the ranks of past or present Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) and other executives of other larger companies, or former 
executives of the company itself. They are usually employed for prestige (if 
they are well known), for their experience or contacts, or for their specialized 
knowledge, which may only be required occasionally. Furthermore, non-
executives place a lot of emphasis on their reputation capital because their 
payment and employment in a company is positively related to their reputation 
[Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983a)]. For these reasons non-executives 
rather than executives have more incentives to promote shareholder interests 
and to be more objective in evaluating the costs and benefits of an acquisition   4
decision [Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Cotter et al (1997)]. Therefore the more 
non-executive directors are on the board the higher the probability of a 
profitable rather than non-profitable acquisition since non-executive directors 
are more likely to take decisions consistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization. Recently, Young (2000) found that the appointment of additional 
non-executive directors by many UK firms has helped to improve board 
structure suggesting that UK boards are better equipped to monitor managers 
effectively. However, even non-executives may have incentives other than their 
reputation since opposing management may make them less attractive to other 
firms whose management is looking to avoid scrutiny and interference 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). On average the evidence suggests that non-
executives promote shareholders’ interests through increased monitoring and 
also that good managers prefer boards with more outsiders [Weisbach (1988), 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Shivdasani (1993), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1994), Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994), Cotter, 
Shivdasani and Zenner (1997)].  
 
According to the Hampel report, (paragraph 12, Summary of Conclusions and 
Recommendations) non-executive directors, in order to be effective, need to 
make up at least one third of the membership of the board. Empirical evidence 
in the UK regarding the board structure and takeovers has been provided among 
others by O’Sullivan and Wong (1998) who find that board composition in the 
UK has no significant effect on the outcome of takeover bids. These findings 
contradict the findings of Constantinou et al (2003) who find a negative and 
significant relationship between non-executive dominated target boards and 
target shareholders’ wealth at the announcement of takeover bids. Further 
research has questioned the monotonic behavior relationship assumed in studies 
that examine the relationship between board composition and firm performance. 
As the percentage of non-executive directors increases in the board the 
importance of executive directors is underrated, resulting in a loss of valuable 
information offered by them concerning the every day activity of the firm, 
which is then reflected in the decision of the firm. Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
find an insignificant positive relationship between the abnormal returns at the 
first announcement date and the fraction of independent non-executive directors 
serving the acquirer’s board and provide evidence that those benefits do not 
accrue continuously as the proportion of independent directors increases. 
 
To sum up, board composition has been the subject of an in-depth scrutiny and 
the evidence regarding its relationship with corporate performance and the 
carrying of more profitable acquisitions is still mixed. Evidence however is in 
favor that non-executive dominated boards are better in monitoring   5
management’s actions and in favor of an optimal mixture of executive and non-
executive directors on the board. 
 
B.2. Stock Ownership 
Stock ownership held by directors, is another characteristic related directly with 
managerial quality. As the stock ownership of managers increases, the interests 
of shareholders and managers coincide, which means that the agency problem 
[Jensen and Meclking (1976)] is reduced. Therefore the objectives of these two 
claimholders of the company converge and fewer acquisitions will be proposed 
for motives other than shareholder wealth maximisation. The findings of 
Lewellen et al (1985) and Lambert and Larcker (1987) come to support this 
alignment of interests; they find that management stock ownership is associated 
with positive acquisition announcement effects in the US. For UK companies, 
Weir (1997) finds that executive directors of acquired firms have significantly 
lower shareholdings and lower proportion of share options than those of non-
acquired firms, which implies that those firms whose directors’ interests are not 
aligned with their shareholders’ through higher stockholdings become possible 
targets. A comparative analysis of key differences between the US and UK 
governance systems from Keasy and Short (1999) suggest that UK management 
become more entrenched at higher levels of ownership (less freedom to mount 
takeover defenses) than their US counterparts, suggesting a non-linear 
relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership. Stulz (1988) 
and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) suggest a similar, non-linear relationship, 
for US firms as well. According to Stulz (1988) high levels of managerial stock 
ownership are harmful to shareholders since managers become insulated from 
some corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. market for corporate control). A 
study by Cosh et al (2001) on a large sample of UK companies suggests that this 
non-linear relationship appears in the long run as well, where at low levels of 
board ownership there is an alignment of interests with shareholders but at high 
levels managerial entrenchment. Stock ownership can also affect positively the 
successful outcome and the friendly nature of takeover bids [O’Sullivan and 
Wong, (1998)] and at the same time can decrease the probability of a takeover 
[Shivdasani, (1993)], suggesting that inefficient management with high 
stockholdings can affect the takeover process. 
 
In contrast to these findings, Loderer and Martin (1997) examine this relation 
under simultaneous equations framework and find that managers who own stock 
at their company may be unable to affect corporate decisions and/or may be 
forced to promote the firm’s performance because of increased competition and 
an effective market for corporate control. This result comes to support the 
findings of earlier studies that also suggest that firm performance and   6
management stock ownership are not related (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990, and Dennis and Denis, 1994). 
 
Therefore there are several conflicting issues concerning the stock ownership of 
both executive and non-executive directors and firm performance, a reflection 
of managerial quality, which affects shareholders’ behaviour: (a) stock 
ownership eliminates the agency problem and therefore it improves managerial 
quality, (b) stock ownership can result in an inefficient market for corporate 
control and deteriorates managerial quality and firm performance, and (c) stock 
ownership can influence the directors’ independent judgement, especially for 
non-executive directors (who are a key issue on the UK corporate governance 
model) and therefore result in a deterioration of the managerial quality of the 
board and thus affect firm performance negatively, (d) stock ownership is not 
related with managerial quality and therefore with firm performance. 
 
B.3. Other Directorships 
Non-executives may serve more than one directorship at the same time, since 
they are not full-time employees of the company. Through additional 
directorships, non-executives create a portfolio of “rich” experience and 
knowledge, which might be helpful for the evaluation of a takeover decision. 
Fama and Jesen (1983) and Ricardo-Campbell (1983) argue that non-executive 
board members who hold multiple directorships have a greater incentive to 
monitor corporate decisions on behalf of all shareholders because these 
directors have made a significant investment in establishing their reputation as 
decision experts. While opposing a proposed acquisition may endanger their 
position in the bidder or target’s board, the cost of supporting a harmful 
decision for shareholders could still be greater, because it would reduce the 
value of the director’s reputation capital in the marketplace for decision experts. 
On the other hand, however, the more directorships a director holds, the less 
devoted to a specific board he/she is and therefore his/her contribution becomes 
less valuable. Therefore when non-executives hold a small number of extra 
directorships this increases the board’s managerial quality, whereas when they 
hold a large number of extra directorships the board’s managerial quality 
decreases.  
 
Shivdasani (1993), for a sample of US companies, finds that additional 
directorships decrease the probability of a hostile takeover, a finding that 
supports the monitoring role of prestigious non-executives. To our knowledge 
there isn’t much empirical work on the relationship between the additional 
directorships held by non-executive directors and the outcome of a takeover. 
Few studies we came across attempt to explore the sources of non-executive   7
directors. Bryant and Conyon (1998) for example find that CEOs in UK 
companies hold on average 0.35 non-executive directorships, a figure which is 
much lower than the 1.87 outside directorships held by CEOs in the US [Booth 
and Deli (1996)]. O’Sullivan (2000) studied the number of additional 
directorships held by 960 executives in UK quoted companies and finds that the 
managers that are less likely to have multiple directorships are mostly those 
who want to pursue their own objectives at their shareholders’ expense whereas 
the more popular non-executives seem to be the well-established executives. 
 
B.4. Board Size 
Another important characteristic related with managerial quality is the number 
of directors serving the board. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest “the size of a 
board should be limited to a maximum of ten directors”. They argue that boards 
of this size allow the directors to get to know each other, to participate fully in 
discussions and to reach a true consensus. The main idea behind their 
suggestion is that when a board consists of many directors not all of them can 
express their opinion and fully explain their arguments during the time provided 
in the meetings. Similarly Jensen (1993) stated that when boards get beyond 
seven or eight people they are less likely to function effectively and are easier 
for the CEO to control.  
 
Furthermore Yermack (1996) states that: “reducing board size is a priority to 
improve troubled companies…small boards are more effective and provide 
stronger CEO performance incentives from compensation and the threat of 
dismissal” which come to support Kini et al (1995) finding that board size 
shrinks after successful tender offers for under-performing companies. Yermack 
(1996) supports that size and firm performance are associated with a convex 
shape relationship suggesting that the largest fraction of lost value occurs as 
boards grow from small to medium size. Therefore, the benefits of increased 
monitoring through larger boards are outweighed by problems associated with 
informational asymmetries between the CEO and the board, communication 
issues and decision making generally [Conyon and Peck, (1998)]. On the other 
hand, however, in larger boards there is more expertise stemming from the 
individual knowledge of each director and more opinions are shared and heard, 




Based on the aforementioned discussion we can conclude that the impact of 
bidder board characteristics on bidder-shareholder wealth accrues through 
managerial quality, which is tightly linked with firm performance. Any   8
characteristic that increases managerial quality (and therefore increases firm 
performance) should have a positive impact on shareholder wealth, whereas any 
characteristic that decreases managerial quality (and therefore decreases firm 
performance) should have a negative effect. However, as already explained, the 
relation should not be monotonic in nature. Therefore, the research hypothesis 
to be tested is: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  a concave quadratic relationship exists between bidder-
shareholder wealth and its board’s characteristics. 
 
An interesting question however, often neglected by researchers, arises at this 
point. If we expect board characteristics to be associated with managerial 
quality and therefore with bidder-shareholder reaction, it is naïve to ignore the 
cross-sectional impact of the target’s board characteristics on bidder-
shareholder wealth. Since bidder-shareholders associate board characteristics of 
their company with managerial quality, and since the outcome of the bid does 
not depend solely on the bidder’s board but also on the target’s board, we would 
expect that the board structure of the targeting company is also linked in a non-
monotonic way with bidder-shareholder wealth through managerial quality. The 
nature of the impact (convex or concave) however is not clear and therefore 
hypothesis 2 becomes: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A non-monotonic relationship exists between target board 
characteristics and bidder-shareholder wealth. 
 
 
II. Data, Methodology, and Descriptive Statistics 
A. Sample and Data Description 
The sample analysed in this study is a comprehensive list of UK firms engaged 
in domestic takeovers over the seven-year period of 1990-1997. The sample 
contains completed transactions, and the firms included in it are listed 
companies on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and are included in the 
Datastream database. 
 
The sample was obtained by searching the “Acquisitions Monthly” database, 
which reports mainly all domestic (UK) merger and acquisition transactions. 
The event date of each acquisition, according to “Acquisitions Monthly” is the 
date of the offer’s initial public announcement. The method of payment, the 
industry which the companies belong into, the date of announcement, and the 
date of the completion of the bid were collected from “Acquisitions Monthly”. 
Names of Chief Executive and Non-Executive Officers (CEOs and CNEOs   9
respectively) for UK acquirers, before and after the bid, were obtained from 
“The Official Stock Exchange Year Book”. It has to be noted, however, that 
“The Official Stock Exchange Year Book” reports CEOs and CNEOs of each 
company at the end of each accounting year. In order to find the CEOs and 
CNEOs during the period before and after the bid announcement we used 
EXTEL Data Base, operated by Financial Times, in which all the changes on the 
board of directors of any company listed on the London Stock Exchange are 
reported. Data for directors’
3 stock ownership, and the number of directorships 
held by each director were collected from the “Price Waterhouse Corporate 
Register”. The sample of acquiring firms used in this study consists of the 
complete universe of firms, which meet the following criteria: 
 
1.  The announcement day is reported in “Acquisitions Monthly”. 
2. The acquirer is quoted on the London Stock Exchange for a minimum 
period of 320 trading days prior and 360 trading days after the takeover bid. 
3. Daily share price data was available 320 trading days before the takeover 
bid and 40 trading days after the takeover bid. 
4.  There are no concurrent acquisitions for the same firm during the forty-day 
period prior and the forty-day period after the announcement day (t=0). 
5.  Both the acquirer and the target are UK public firms. 
6.  The acquirer or the target are not financial services or utility firms
4. 
 
Over the seven-year period that is covered from our analysis, we study 185 
domestic acquisitions made by 162 different firms. These transactions are quite 
unevenly distributed across the years studied; the proportion of deals analysed 
during the years 90-94 range from an annual figure of 8  to 11 percent but in 
subsequent years, 95 –97, the sample deals account for 14 to 19 percent, which 
is attributed to the larger number of deals that took place from the mid 90s 
onwards. 
 
B. Methodology: Estimation of Abnormal Stock Returns 
Standard event study methodology has been adopted in this research. Abnormal 
returns for each acquirer have been calculated for 40 days before the 
announcement and for up to 40 days after the announcement of the bid. 
Although there is an ongoing debate about the benchmark used in order to 
calculate abnormal returns, in this study we use the market model (MM), which 
is widely used for short-term analysis. 
 
According to Fama (1976), the market model is specified as: 
 
it mt i i it e R b a R + + =        (1)  10
 
where Rit is the rate or return of the i
th security at event day t
5.  The abnormal 
return of the i
th security at event day t is estimated as it it it R R AR ˆ − = , where 
mt i i it R a R β ˆ ˆ ˆ − =  and a ˆ,  β ˆ  are ordinary least square estimates of the market model 
parameters over the period t = –360 to t = – 60 trading days relative to the 
announcement day
6. The statistical significance of the average abnormal return 
(AAR) for a sample of N companies for the event day t and the cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAAR) is assessed using standard event 
methodology techniques.  
 
C. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of table I gives a brief description of the sample and bid characteristics 
of the takeovers included in the sample. The average acquirer’s size (market 
value of common stock), 60 days before the announcement date, is £1,223 
million (with a median of £210 million). Acquired companies are much smaller 
in size with an average market value, 60 days before the announcement date, of 
£227 million (with a median of £33 million). These large differences between 
the mean and the median market value of equity imply that in our sample there 
are some bidders and some targets that are substantially larger than the average 
size bidder and target firm respectively. The average ratio of target size to 
bidder size is 0.19, with a median value of 0.25, which means that the majority 
of bidding firms are attempting to acquire firms of about a fifth of their own 
size. Finally, the bid premium, as reported in Acquisitions Monthly, averaged 
1.23 one month before the announcement, and 1.40 one day before the 
announcement of the bid.
7 
 
As can be seen from Panel B of the same table, 17 percent (32 out of 185) of the 
bids were hostile but successful, a percentage smaller than the ones reported by 
previous studies. Franks and Mayer (1996) study a sample of 325 UK bids 
during 1985-86 and find 23% of the bids to be hostile, Cosh and Guest (2000) 
study a sample of 204 UK takeovers during 1985-96 and similarly find 23% of 
the cases to be hostile, and finally Schwert (2000) studies a sample of 2,346 
takeovers during 1975-96 and finds 21% of the bids to be hostile. The 
difference in numbers can be attributed to the period investigated. 52 out of 185 
were financed completely by a cash arrangement and 100 out of 185 were 
between companies within the same 2-digit SIC industry sector.  
  11
Table I. Sample and bid characteristics of the 185 UK sample takeovers during 
the period 90-97 
 
Panel A of this table describes the general characteristics and Panel B the deal characteristics 
of the 185 UK sample takeovers during the period 1990 – 1997. Data regarding the deals 
have been obtained from Acquisitions Monthly. Data regarding board characteristics were 
collected from the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register. Data was obtained from the bi-
annual volumes for the years Sept 1989 to Sept 1994 and from the quarterly volumes for the 
years 1995 onwards. Financial services and utility firms have been excluded from our 
analysis. 
 
Panel A: General characteristics 
Variable Mean  Median  St.  Dev. 
Market Value of Bidder Common Stock (£millions)
a 1223 210  2460
Market Value of Target Common Stock (£millions)
a 227 33  573
Ratio of Target to Bidder  0.19 0.25  0.53
Bid Premium
b  
One Month Before Announcement  1.23 1.21  0.18
One Day Before Announcement  1.40 1.40  0.23
Panel B: Deal characteristics 
c   
Variable     Number 
Hostility    
Hostile Successful Bids      32
Non-Hostile Successful Bids      153
Method of Payment    
Cash Offers
d     52
Other
e     133
Related and Unrelated Transaction    
Same Operations
f     100
Different Operations      85
Total Number of Bids      185
 
a The market value of bidder and target common stock is measured 60 days before the 
announcement as that reported in acquisitions monthly. 
b  The bid premium is collected from Acquisitions Monthly and is calculated as follows: 
Bid Premium one month before the announcement = (Bid Price per Share/Share Price of 
the Target one Month before Announcement) 
Bid Premium one day before the announcement = (Bid Price per Share/Share Price of 
the Target one Day before Announcement) 
c  All the information in the table was obtained by Acquisitions Monthly Year Report, issued 
at the end of each year. 
d  The merger was financed completely by a cash arrangement. 
e  Includes any combination of shares exchange, issue of debt, or cash. 




Table II summarises the board characteristics of the 185-bidding firms before 
the announcement day. The average acquiring-firm’s board has 9 of whom 56% 
are classified as executives and 44% as non-executives. According to Conyon 
and Perk (1998) the UK board size has on average 8.57 members, which is very 
close to the number we report as well. In concurrence with Dahya, McConnell 
and Travlos (2002) our results suggest that the percentage of non-executive 
directors for the UK bidding firms has increased significantly after the release 
of the Cadbury Report. Board sizes however did not change significantly. 
Executive directors held, on average, 6% of their firm’s common stock, whereas 
the average stock ownership of non-executive directors was only 1.74%. For 
both types of directors, the mean ownership stake exceeds the median, 
indicating that the distribution of stock ownership is skewed to the right. These 
figures are similar to those reported by Cosh et al (2000) for a UK sample of 
acquirers and Lewellen et al (1985) for a US sample of firms. The statistics of 
Table II also reveal that during the process of the takeover non-executive 
directors held, on average, 1.55 extra seats each in other boards. This number is 
smaller than the 2.4 extra seats reported by Cosh and Hughes (1997) for their 
sample of UK giant companies in 1996 but very close to average number of all 
the directors. 
 
As it concerns acquired firms (only 174 target companies were eligible for 
inclusion in our analysis) boards are on average smaller than those of the 
bidders by two seats (see Table II) but still very close to the number proposed 
by Conyon and Perk (1998) about the average UK board size. The board size of 
acquired firms, however, did not change significantly after the release of the 
Cadbury committee as suggested by Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002). 
The percentage of non-executives, however, increased significantly from 35 
percent to 45 percent after the release of the Cadbury committee. The overall 
percentage of non-executive directors in targets’ boards throughout the whole 
period is 44 percent. Executive directors, as in the case of bidders, hold on 
average a higher percentage of stocks than non-executives (6% and 2% 
respectively) with an overall of 8 percent, which is one percentage point higher 
than that of bidders. Finally non-executive directors of the target firm hold on 
average 1 extra seat in other boards which is smaller, as it was expected, from 
the one reported by Cosh and Hughes (1997). 
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Table II. Acquiring and acquired firms’ board characteristics  
 
This table describes the board characteristics of the acquiring and the acquired firms for the 
185 UK sample takeovers during the period 1990 – 1997. Data regarding the deals have been 
obtained from Acquisitions Monthly. Data regarding board characteristics were collected 
from the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register. Data was obtained from the bi-annual 
volumes for the years Sept 1989 to Sept 1994 and from the quarterly volumes for the years 
1995 onwards. Financial services and utility firms have been excluded from our analysis. 
 
 Characteristics  Acquiring companies   Acquired companies
  Mean Median St. 
Dev.
 Mean  Median St. 
Dev.
Board Size             
Number of directors  8.78 8.00 3.86 6.69  6.00  2.36
Number of directors before Cadbury report 8.50 8.00 3.11 6.57  6.00  2.31
Number of directors after Cadbury report  8.85 8.00 4.01 6.72  6.00  2.38
Non executive Directors    
Non-executive directors  44% 43% 19% 44%  42%  22%
Non-executives before Cadbury report  35% 33% 17% 32%  33%  23%
Non-executives after Cadbury report  45% 44% 19% 47%  42%  21%
Directors’ stock ownership    
Directors’ total stock ownership  7% 1% 13% 8%  1%  4%
Executives’ stock ownership
a 6% 1% 12% 6%  1%  13%
Non-executives’ stock ownership
b 1% 1% 4% 2%  1%  7%
    
Other Directorships held by non-executives 1.55 1.50 1.12 1.41  1.20  1.32
a Executive directors’ stock ownership is the percentage of  common stock held by all 
executive directors. 
b Non-executive directors’ stock ownership is the percentage of common stock held by all 
non-executive directors. 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
A. Overall Sample 
Average Abnormal Returns for bidding companies obtained from forty days 
prior to forty days after the announcement of the bid are presented in Table III 
together with the cumulative abnormal returns for several periods. 
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Table III.  
 
Panel A: Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) and z-values for the bidding firms involved 
in 185 domestic (UK) acquisitions from forty days before to forty days after the initial 
announcement day (t=0) 
 
Panel B: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for several time-windows for the 
bidding firms involved in 185 domestic (UK) acquisitions. 
 
Panel A 
Event Day  AAR (%)  z-value 
-40 0.13  1.29 
-20 -0.31  -0.75 
-10 -0.27  -3.81** 
-9 0.11  0.60 
-8 -0.10  -0.96 
-7 0.19  0.24 
-6 -0.045  -2.33* 
-5 0.23  1.51 
-4 -0.02  -0.52 
-3 -0.12  -1.74 
-2 0.04  -0.64 
-1 -0.19  -2.57** 
0 -1.1036  -14.95** 
+1 -0.24  -3.17** 
+2 -0.13  -1.45 
+3 0.02  0.44 
+4 -0.01  -0.14 
+5 -0.08  -0.61 
+6 0.06  0.84 
+7 0.18  1.61 
+8 -0.23  -0.51 
+9 -0.05  -1.16 
+10 0.07  -0.85 
+20 -0.12  -0.78 
+40 -0.25  -2.82** 
   
  Panel B   
Time 
Interval  CAARs z-value  Time 
Interval  CAARs z-value 
(-40,0) -0.46  -4.43**  (0,1) -1.35  -10.44** 
(-20,0) -1.05  -6.86**  (0,10) -0.153 -5.75** 
(-10,0)  -1.31 -7.27*  (0,20) -1.43 -4.53** 
(-1,0) -1.29 -10.12**  (0,40) -1.32  -3.14** 
(-1,1)  -1.54 -9.26**  (-40,40) -0.67 -3.44** 
* Significant at the 0.05 
** Significant at the 0.01 
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As shown in Panel A of Table III, announcements of domestic takeovers are 
associated with statistically significant negative abnormal returns reaching an 
average level of –1.10 percent (Z=-14.95) on the announcement day. Results 
also report a negative abnormal return one day before (t=-1) and one day after 
(t=+1) the announcement of –0.19 percent and  –0.24 percent respectively. The 
significantly negative abnormal return the day before the announcement 
suggests leakage of information, which is valued by the market negatively, 
whereas the significantly negative abnormal return for the day after suggests 
that the market needs more than one day to digest the event. Significantly 
negative average abnormal returns are also reported ten and six days before the 
announcement day of the order of –0.27 and –0.04 percent respectively (z-
values are –3.81 and –2.33 respectively). The significance of these abnormal 
returns reinforces the view that the market somehow anticipated the bid since all 
companies with concurrent events were removed from our sample. The big 
difference at the level of the average abnormal returns between the pre-bid 
period and the announcement day suggests that although there were rumours in 
the market during the pre-bid period these were evaluated moderately by the 
market because the ultimate bid details (i.e. terms of the bid) could not be 
known with certainty. 
 
Panel B of Table III shows the cumulative abnormal returns for several periods 
commencing forty days before to forty days after the announcement day (t=0). 
CAARs measure the returns for an equally weighted portfolio consisting of 
bidding companies’ shares bought at the beginning of the event-window and 
held until the end. As can be seen in panel B of Table III, CAARs are negative 
and statistically significant for all the event-windows calculated before and after 
the announcement which is an implication that acquirers do not perform well 
either shortly before or shortly after the takeover. The evaluation, however, of 
the long-run impact of acquisitions on bidder-shareholder wealth (before and 
after), which is beyond the scope of this work, should be based on improved 
methods for testing and calculating long-run abnormal returns [Lyon, Barber, 
and Tsai (1999), and Mitchell and Stafford (2000)]. 
 
B. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
B.1. Motivation 
In order to obtain a better insight of the impact of board characteristics on the 
changes in bidder-shareholder wealth, during the announcement of a takeover, a 
cross-sectional analysis will follow. Several studies examine the issue of the 
determinants of the abnormal returns among which are the studies from 
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), Travlos (1983), Kaufman (1988), 
Servaes(1991), Eckbo and Thorburn(2000), and Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000). 
The main findings from these studies is that the size of the target relative to the  16
bidder, the method of payment and the hostility of the bid are some of the most 
important variables explaining the wealth effects of a takeover. Variables are 
grouped into three broad categories: variables concerning board characteristics 
of the bidder and target, variables concerning the bid characteristics, and 
variables concerning firm characteristics. The last two are the control variables. 
In both models estimated in this section we use CAARs for days (-1,1) as our 
dependent variable, since only for this period CAARs are statistically significant 
in all three days consecutively. Results are presented in Table IV (Appendix 1 
provides a delineate analysis of how each variable used in this section is defined 
and/or measured). 
 
B.2. Group One: Board Characteristics of Bidders and Targets 
Percentage of Non-Executive Directors: This variable measures the percentage 
of non-executive directors in the board. For the bidding company we denote this 
variable as PNEB and for the target company as PNET. As already explained, 
non-executive directors are likely to be more objective in evaluating the costs 
and benefits of a proposed acquisition than executive directors since they are 
perceived to be independent. It is hypothesised however that there should be an 
optimum level of independent directors in the board beyond which executive 
directors are underrated, resulting in a loss of valuable information offered by 
them which leads to a loss of managerial quality. The coefficient estimate for 
PNEB is positive as expected but statistically significant only at 10% in model 1 
whereas in model 2 coefficient estimates become statistically significant at 5%. 
Model 2 suggests that the optimum level of non-executives is 48 percent and 
therefore our results are consistent with hypothesis 1. For low levels of PNEB 
the market reacts positively rewarding the existence of non-executives in the 
board. The market reacts more favourably as the percentage of non-executives 
increases but after a certain level (over 48%) it reacts negatively to the 
announcement of bids from such boards. Although this finding reinforces the 
view of the Hampel committee which suggests that “...it is difficult for them 
(non-executives) to be effective if they make up less than one third of the 
board”
8, it also suggests that there should be an upper limit as to how many non-
executives should serve the board. 
 
Coefficient estimate for PNET is positive but statistically insignificant in model 
1 whereas in model 2 PNET and its square term become statistically significant 
suggesting a U-shape relationship with CAARs and therefore hypothesis 2 is 
supported. Estimated coefficients suggest that for low levels of non-executive 
directors in the target’s board bidder-shareholders react unfavourably at the 
announcement of the acquisition, whereas as the percentage increases over 48% 
(according to model 2) the announcement of the bid seems to be good news. If  17
we accept the view that bidder-shareholders associate managerial quality with 
the percentage of non-executive directors then a possible explanation might be 
that they expect that managerial quality at the target’s board will be higher for 
certain levels of PNET and therefore it is more likely that target directors will 
negotiate the bid in such a way as to absorb most of the benefits created through 
the acquisition. As PNET increases beyond 48 percent managerial quality 
decreases and therefore most of the benefits of the acquisition will be left to the 
bidder. 
 
Stock Ownership: This is the proportion of the total ordinary share capital 
issued by the company and held by executive (EOSB) and/or non-executive 
(NEOSB) directors for the bidder as well as executive (EOST) and/or non-
executive (NEOST) directors for the target. Not all coefficient estimates have 
the expected sign and only EOST, in model 1, is statistically significant. Neither 
hypothesis 1 nor hypothesis 2 is supported from our results. Instead we provide 
evidence of a positive linear relationship between bidder-shareholder wealth and 
the stock ownership of the executive directors in the target’s board. A possible 
explanation for our result is given by O’Sallivan and Wong, (1998), who state 
that companies where executive directors own a significant proportion of equity 
are less likely to contest a takeover bid, because in targets where management 
possess a significant proportion of equity, bidders obtain their approval before 
they launch a bid. 
 
Other Directorships Held by Non-Executives: This is the average number of 
extra directorships held by non-executive directors of the bidding company 
(OTHB) or the target company (OTHT) in addition to the seat held on the 
bidding or targeting company’s board respectively. The estimated coefficient 
for OTHB in model 1 is insignificantly positive whereas the coefficient estimate 
for  OTHT is significantly negative. In model 2, the coefficient estimate for 
OTHB
2 has the expected negative sign but is statistically insignificant whereas 
the coefficient estimate for OTHT
2 is negative and statistically significant at 
10% level. Although insignificant our results for OTHB support the proposed 
non-linear relationship of hypothesis 1. Coefficient estimates in models 1 and 2 
do not support hypothesis 2, but rather support a significant negative linear 
relationship between bidder-shareholders wealth and OTHT. This result 
reinforces the view that extra directorships in the target board increase the 
company’s managerial quality and therefore it is more likely that target-
shareholders will absorb most of the benefits that might be created through the 
acquisition. 
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Board Size: This is the number of the bidders’ board members (BSB) and 
targets’ board members (BST) respectively. As can be seen in Table IV, 
coefficient estimates for both BSB and BST are statistically insignificant in 
model 1 whereas in model 2 they become statistically significant for BST. 
Although insignificant, coefficient estimates for BSB (model 2) support the 
proposed non-linear relationship. The board size of the target, however, seems 
to be more important for bidder-shareholders than the board size of their own 
company since coefficient estimates are statistically significant in both models. 
Coefficient estimates for BST in model 2 are statistically significant suggesting 
an inverse U shape relation between CAARs and BST and therefore hypothesis 2 
is supported. The optimum level of directors in the target’s board is 7, which is 
equal to the average number of directors serving target companies included in 
our sample. A possible explanation for this might be the fact that larger boards 
are less effective [Yrmack, (1996)] because the benefits from increased 
monitoring through larger boards are outweighed by problems associated with 
informational asymmetries [Conyon and Peck, (1998)] and therefore the 
possibility of the management of the company being problematic is higher. 
Under these circumstances bidder-shareholders react unfavourably to big, and 
probably, troublesome management teams. 
 
B.3. Group Two: Characteristics of the Bid 
Ratio of Target to Bidder (RTB): This variable measures the relative size of the 
target to the bidder and it is the ratio of the market value of the target company 
to the market value of the bidding company. When a bidder is relatively large in 
comparison with the target then the bidding company is more flexible with the 
bid price in the sense that it might offer a higher bid price to the target even if it 
isn’t worth it. On the other hand when a target is relatively large in comparison 
with the bidder, there is not much flexibility for high bid premiums and it is 
more likely that the bid will proxy the real value of the target. In addition to that 
the higher the relative size of the target to the bidder, the more important is the 
acquisition for the bidder and therefore both shareholders and analysts will 
scrutinise the bid in much more detail revealing any unnecessary bid premium. 
Therefore a positive relationship between the relative size of the two companies 
and the bidder-shareholder gain should exist. Franks and Harris (1989) use RTB 
as an explanatory variable for targets’ shareholders wealth but they provide 
negative but statistically insignificant evidence for the relationship of the two 
variables. As can be seen in Table IV, the RTB coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant. This result suggests that the bigger the relative size of 
target is to that of the bidder, the higher the gains from the acquisition are, 
which is in accord with our expectations. 
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Hostile Bid (HOST): this is a dummy variable for hostile bids. It takes the value 
of 1 when the bid is hostile, and 0 otherwise. This is a control variable and tests 
whether acquirers who take no approval from the target’s board of directors 
about their bid tend to decrease their shareholders’ gains. Therefore the impact 
of HOST on shareholder gains should be negative, since resistance of the bid 
implies an increase of the bid price that is paid to the target until the acquiring 
company obtains no excess returns or in the worst situation failure of the 
acquisition. In our case, however, we would expect no significant impact on 
bidder-shareholder wealth since it is unlikely that the target’s board will oppose 
or consent to the bid from the first day of the announcement or the day after. As 
can be seen in Table IV, however, both models return negative and statistically 
significant coefficients for the HOST variable. A hostile takeover therefore 
decreases shareholder wealth by about 2.2% (average of the two models). 
 
Operations of the Bidder and Target (OPER): this is a dummy variable (control 
variable), which takes the value of 1 if the two companies, bidder and target, 
have the same operations and 0 otherwise. Mergers of two companies with the 
same operations would give higher returns because of the operational synergies 
that arise and lead to higher monopolistic power in the market for the new 
company. Furthermore, according to financial theory, diversification at the 
corporate level is redundant because in perfect capital markets investors can 
directly derive the gains of such diversification by holding a diversified 
portfolio. Although the coefficient estimates for OPER  in both models are 
statistically insignificant, they have the expected impact on CAARs.  
 
Bid Settlement (BIDSET): this is also a dummy variable (control variable), 
which takes the value of 1 if the bid was financed entirely by cash and 0 
otherwise. Earlier studies of Frank and Harris (1986b) and Frank, Harris, and 
Mayers (1988) have shown that the method of financing an acquisition also 
influences its outcome. Information and agency models can explain the 
difference in the share returns between cash-financed and equity-financed 
acquisitions. According to Myers and Majluf (1984) information asymmetries 
about the value of targets discourage acquisitions, whereas information 
asymmetry about the value of the bidder encourages the use of cash finance. 
Therefore if acquirers are better informed about the value of their own equity 
and mis-valuations are revealed only after the acquisition, the acquirer has an 
incentive to use cash during the periods of under-valuations. Thus the use of 
equity conveys “bad news” and therefore decreases in share returns, whereas the 
use of cash conveys “good news” and therefore increases in share returns. 
Evidence from Franks, Harris, and Mayer’s work (1988) suggests that neither 
cash nor equity acquisitions displayed significant abnormal returns to bidder  20
shareholders in the month of an acquisition. In this study the means of payment 
were discriminated into entirely cash-financed acquisitions and non-entirely 
cash-financed acquisitions (e.g. all equity, equity and cash, bonds, etc.). 
Estimated coefficient of BIDSET, although insignificant, suggests a positive 
impact on CAAR in both models as expected, which means that cash-financed 
acquisitions have a positive impact on the shareholders’ wealth. 
 
B.4. Group Three: Characteristics of the Firm 
Total Sales: This variable measures the total sales of the bidder (TSB). It is used 
as a proxy measure for the size of the company since according to Fama and 
French (1993) size is related to profitability. As they mention, recessions may 
depress prolonged earnings for small firms. In a similar line of thought Cosh, 
Hughes, Lee and Singh (1989) find that size is the most persistently successful 
discriminator between the living and the dead, and size and share return as the 
most successful between the latter and their killers. Size along with firm growth 
are also related to executive remuneration and board changes. According to 
Cosh and Hughes (1997) size reduces the probability of the CEO being sacked. 
As can be seen in Table IV, the TSB variable has very little impact on 
shareholder wealth but is positive and statistically significant in model 2 in line 
to our expectations.  
 
Market to Book Value (MTBV): Market to Book Value is the fraction of the 
market value 60 days before the announcement to the most recently publicly 
available book value of the bidder. High levels of MTBV might be the cause of 
two effects: high growth and under-investment. According to our estimations 
presented in Table IV, MTBV has a very small, negative impact on shareholder 
wealth, which is around –0.03% (average of two models). A possible 
explanation is that bidders with high levels of MTBV extrapolate their past 
performance (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). 
 
Capital Gearing
9 (CGB): Bidders with high levels of capital gearing experience 
an increase in their shareholders’ wealth by almost 0.2% (average of two 
models). This increase is statistically significant in the second model. The result 
obtained is not in accord with the one expected since bidders with high levels of 
capital gearing are more likely to pay by means other than cash, e.g. share 
exchange. As already explained, the use of means other than cash conveys bad 
news to the market and therefore a decrease to the bidder-shareholder wealth. A 
possible explanation for this result might be that shareholders of bidders with 
high leverage react positively because they believe that the ability of their 
company to serve its debt improves after the acquisition and at the same time 
their debt capacity may improve.  21
Table IV. Cross-sectional regression results 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional regression results for the 185 UK sample 
takeovers during the period 1990 – 1997 based on the following model: 
 
CAAR(-1,1)=f (Bidder’s and targets’ board characteristics,  
bid characteristics, firm characteristics) 
 
We present the results for two models; in model 1 we use only the levels of the 
dependent variables, whereas in model 2 we use the square term for each of our 
explanatory variables.  Data regarding the deals have been obtained from 
Acquisitions Monthly. Data regarding board characteristics were collected from 
the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register. Data was obtained from the bi-annual 
volumes for the years Sept 1989 to Sept 1994 and from the quarterly volumes 
for the years 1995 onwards. Financial services and utility firms have been 
excluded from our analysis. (In parentheses we provide the p-values for the 
significance of the estimated coefficients). 
 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2 
Constant term (C)  -0.089  (0.01)**  -0.242  (0.00)*** 
       
A. Board Characteristics       
A1. Acquirer       
Board Size –Number- (BSB)  0.003  (0.18)  0.012  (0.11) 
Board Size –Square Number- ( BSB
2)     -0.001 (0.12) 
% Non Executives (PNEB)  0.072  (0.09)*  0.341  (0.03)** 
% Non Executives –square-  (PNEB
2)     -0.358 (0.05)* 
Executives % Stock Ownership (EOSB)  0.043  (0.32)  0.186  (0.16) 
Executives % Stock Ownership –square-  (EOSB
2)     -0.253 (0.18) 
Non Executives % Stock Ownership (NEOSB)  -0.066  (0.44)  0.258  (0.20) 
Non Executives % Stock Ownership –square- (NESOB
2)     -0.762 (0.17) 
Other Directorships (OTHB)  0.005  (0.25)  0.016  (0.25) 
Other Directorships –square-  (OTHB
2)     -0.002 (0.38) 
       
A2. Target       
Board Size -Number- (BST)  -0.001  (0.57)  0.019  (0.02)** 
Board Size –Square Number (BST
2)     -0.001 (0.00)*** 
% Non Executives (PNET)  0.031  (0.24)  -0.130  (0.09)* 
% Non Executives –square- (PNET
2)     0.136 (0.06)* 
Executives % Stock Ownership (EOST)  0.063  (0.05)*  0.087  (0.43) 
Executives % Stock Ownership –square- (EOST
2)     -0.059 (0.73) 
Non Executives % Stock Ownership (NEOST)  0.005  (0.90)  0.021  (0.89) 
Non Executives % Stock Ownership -square- (NEOST
2)     -0.031  (0.90) 
Other Directorships (OTHT)  -0.013  (0.02)**  0.012  (0.29) 
Other Directorships –square- (OTHT
2)     -0.005 (0.06)* 
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B. Bid Characteristics       
Ratio of Target Market Value to Bidder Market Value (RTB)  0.031  (0.08)*  0.034  (0.04)** 
Bid Settlement [Dummy = 1 if bid is financed entirely by cash- 
(BIDSET)] 
0.008  (0.56)  0.014  (0.18) 
Operations [Dummy = 1 if the two companies have the same 
operations- (OPER)] 
0.010  (0.45)  0.019  (0.18) 
Hostile -Dummy Variable, equals 1 if bid is hostile- (HOST)  -0.022  (0.08)*  -0.023  (0.10) 
       
C. Firm Characteristics       
Capital Gearing (CG)  0.001  (0.41)  0.003  (0.02)** 
Market to Book Value (MTBV)  -0.001  (0.38)  -0.001  (0.50) 
Total Sales (TSB)  0.001  (0.30)  0.001  (0.08)* 
        
Diagnostic Tests    
Number of Observations  174 174 
R-square 0.29  0.44 
R-square (Adjusted)  0.16  0.26 
F-statistic (probability)  2.29   (0.00)***  2.49   (0.00)*** 
    




In this study we investigate whether board characteristics of both bidder and 
target are important in explaining bidder-shareholder wealth changes around the 
announcement of a takeover. The major advancement of this study was to 
examine whether there is a cross-relationship among bidder-shareholder wealth 
and the characteristics of the target-board as well as to examine the non-
linearity of this relationship. Controlling for other relevant factors we provide 
evidence that certain board characteristics of both bidder and target are 
important and non-linearly related to bidder-shareholder wealth as hypothesised 
but more importantly we provide evidence that bidder-shareholders wealth 
depends more on target’s board characteristics rather than on their own 
company’s board. 
 
More specifically, as already explained: 1) the percentage of non-executive 
directors (concave quadratic relationship), 2) the number of directors (convex 
quadratic relationship), 3) the number of extra seats held by non-executives 
(negative linear relationship), and 4) the stock ownership of the executive 
directors (positive linear relationship) serving the target’s board are the 
characteristics found to be statistically significant in explaining changes in 
bidder-shareholder wealth during the three day-period around the announcement 
(-1,1). From the bidder’s board only the percentage of non-executive directors 
(convex quadratic relationship) serving on the board is found to be statistically 
significant. 
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In addition to the above, our results indicate that the announcement of an 
acquisition in the UK was followed by statistically significant negative 
abnormal returns. Statistically negative abnormal returns were also reported ten, 
six, and one day(s) before the announcement of the acquisition, suggesting 
leakage of information before the formal announcement of the event. Although 
beyond the scope of this work, the market seems not to be efficient, at least in at 
its strong form. 
 
Control variables like the bid settlement and the operations of bidder and target 
do not seem to be important in explaining abnormal returns during the three-day 
event period of the announcement of a takeover in the UK during the period 
1990-1997. Hostility of the bid (contrary to what is expected) and the relative 
size of the target to bidder, however, seem to be important in explaining the 
reaction of bidder-shareholders during the announcement of the takeover. 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this work. Firstly, the fact that the target’s 
board characteristics are more important for bidder-shareholders. This is a 
rational conclusion that shouldn’t be neglected by researchers and market 
analysts. The fact that bidder-shareholders do not consider stock ownership, 
board size, and other directorships held by non-executives important in 
evaluating the announcement of the bid does not imply that these are not 
important or that they are not correlated with managerial quality. What it 
implies though is that if bidder-shareholders hold shares of their company at the 
time of the announcement (excluding those who hold shares for speculation 
reasons) it means that they approve the quality of the management team 
according to their individual standards (assuming that managerial quality is 
related with firm performance) and therefore are happy with the characteristics 
of the bid. However, they need an indicator of managerial quality that relates to 
the instant decisions of the board, like the decision for a corporate combination, 
and this indicator seems to be the percentage of non-executive directors. On the 
other hand bidder-shareholders are not very well acquainted with the managerial 
qualities of the target and therefore they evaluate almost every possible 
information they can about the target’s board in order to decide about their 
reaction. It has to be remembered, however, that although the target’s board 
characteristics have a clear effect on bidder-shareholder’s wealth, the 
relationships supported by our sample are not homogeneous in nature (possible 
reasons are discussed in the previous section).  
 
Secondly, our results do not support the view that independent boards are more 
likely to create benefits for their shareholders during the acquisition process. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the optimum level of non- 24
executives for both bidder and target firms is 48 percent, which is a grey area 
and one cannot say with certainty whether dependent or independent boards are 
more efficient. Our results suggest that both executive and non-executive 
directors are very important in a company’s board and should hold an equal 
number of seats. In absolute terms, however, executives should be marginally 
more. This result stresses the need for more research on whether “dependent” 
boards are more efficient than “independent” ones, at least in the UK. Any 
inference on executives and non-executive directors, however, must be treated 
with some caution. Most of the UK corporations, according to Cosh and Hughes 
(1997) are mainly dominated by executives and the majority of non-executives 
that form half of the board are in fact not independent (“drawn from the ranks of 
past or present CEOs and executives of other larger companies, or former 
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Appendix - Variable definitions 
 
The sample used in this study includes 185 tender offers during the period 1990 
– 1997. Companies for which data was not available for board, deal or firm 
characteristics have been excluded from the sample. Moreover, companies 
where either the bidder or the target was a foreign firm were eliminated from 
the sample. The sample includes only UK public companies. 
 
A. Board characteristics 
All data related with board characteristics was collected from the ‘Price 
Waterhouse Corporate Register’. Data was obtained from the bi-annual volumes 
for the years from September 1989 to September 1994 and from the quarterly 
volumes for the years 1995 onwards. 
A1. Percentage of Non-executives (PNEB, PNET) 
This variable measures the proportion of non-executive (outside) directors 
represented on the board. The ‘Price Waterhouse Corporate Register’ lists 
separately the names of executive and non-executive directors. This variable is 
constructed by adding the number of non-executives divided by the total 




 are also included to examine non-linearities in the 
relation under consideration. 
A2. Other directorships (OTHB, OTHT) 
This variable measures the average number of additional directorships held by 
non-executive directors. For every acquisition we find the names of the 
non-executive directors of both the acquirer and the acquired companies on the 
‘Price Waterhouse Corporate Register’ (on the volume that is closest to the 
announcement date). We then use the "Directors and Officers" section of the 
‘Price Waterhouse Corporate Register’ that lists the directorships of each 
director, and we find how many additional directorships are held by the 
non-executive directors. Finally to obtain the average number of additional 
directorships we add the additional directorships of all non-executives in a 
particular board divided by the total number of non-executive directors. The 
squared terms, OTHB
2 and OTHT
2 are also included to examine non-linearities 
in the relation under consideration. 
A3. Executives % stock ownership (EOSB, EOST) 
This variable measures the percentage of the total number of ordinary shares 
held by executive (inside) directors. To construct this variable for every 
acquisition we find the acquiring company on the ‘Price Waterhouse Corporate 
Register’ (on the volume that is closest to the announcement date) and we add 
the ordinary shares held by executives divided by the total number of issued  32
ordinary shares. The square terms, EOSB
2 and EOST
2, are also included in the 
model to capture non-linearities in the CAR-ownership relation. 
A4. Non-executives % stock ownership (NEOSB, NEOST) 
This variable measures the percentage of the total number of ordinary shares 
held by non executive (outside) directors. To construct this variable for every 
acquisition we find the acquiring company on the ‘Price Waterhouse Corporate 
Register’ (on the volume that is closest to the announcement date) and we add 
the ordinary shares held by non-executives divided by the total number of 
issued ordinary shares. The square terms, NEOSB
2 and NEOST
2, are also 
included in the model to capture non-linearities in the CAR-ownership relation. 
A5. Board size 
This variable measures the total number of directors in the board (log-
transformed). For every acquisition we find the acquiring company on the ‘Price 
Waterhouse Corporate Register’ (on the volume that is closest to the 
announcement date) and we add all executives and non-executives to obtain the 
total number of directors on the board. 
 
B. Bid characteristics 
All data related with bid characteristics was collected from the ‘Acquisitions 
Monthly’. 
B1. Bid settlement (BIDSET) 
This is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bid settlement is entirely made in 
cash and 0 otherwise. ‘Acquisitions Monthly’ includes a synopsis for every 
acquisition that describes the general terms of the deal. These terms include the 
exchange ratio, the price paid for every target share acquired as well as the 
medium of payment. We consider cash financed acquisitions, those acquisitions 
in which the acquirer has paid only cash for the acquisition and no shares were 
issued for this purpose. 
B2. Same operations (OPER) 
This is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the acquirer and the target are in the 
same industry and 0 otherwise. ‘Acquisitions Monthly’ describes the type of 
their operations separately for the target and the bidder (this industry 
classification is based on the US 92 sic classification). Based on this description 
we define an acquisition as a related acquisition if both the bidder and the target 
have similar industry classification, otherwise the deal is classified as unrelated. 
B3. Hostile bid (HOST) 
This is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the bid is hostile and 0 otherwise. A 
bid is defined as hostile when the initial reaction of the target’s board is to 
recommend their shareholders to reject the offer. We consider a bid ‘hostile’ if 
‘Acquisitions Monthly’ reports that the target firm has resisted the offer. A bid 
is considered as non-hostile or ‘friendly’ if it is reported in the ‘Acquisitions  33
Monthly’ that the target’s board has accepted the offer. If the bid was hostile, 
but at last was completed, it is considered as ‘hostile successful’. 
B3. Ratio of target-to-bidder market value (RTB) 
This variable is measured as the ratio of the target’s market value of equity to 
the bidder’s at the announcement date. Data was collected from Datastream 
using program code 900B and accounting item MV. 
 
C. Firm characteristics 
Data for share returns and accounting items was collected from Datastream. 
C1. Firm size (TSB) 
We approximate firm size by the logarithm of bidder’s total sales at the end of 
the year preceding the event year. Data was collected from Datastream using 
program code 900B and mnemonic 104. 
C2. Market to book value of equity (MTBV) 
This variable is measured as the market value of equity 60 days before the bid 
announcement day divided by the book value of equity of the acquirer at the end 
of the year preceding the event year. It proxies the growth opportunities of the 
bidding firm and the quality of its management. Data was collected from 
Datastream using program code 900B and accounting item MTBV. 
C3. Capital gearing (in book values) (CG)  
This variable is defined as total loans (total debt) divided by the sum of equity 
capital plus reserves minus total intangibles at the end of the year preceding the 





















1  It has a mixture of executive and non-executive directors only. 
 
2  For takeovers see: Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Martin and 
McConnell (1991); Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993); for board composition 
see: Grossman and Hart (1980), Manne (1965), Jensen (1988). 
 
3  The term “Directors” refers to both executive and non-executive directors. 
 
4  Utility and financial services firms are heavily regulated and therefore this 
might introduce biases in our analysis. 
 
5  The share return is derived from the Datastream Return Index (Datatype 
“RI”) 
 
6  In order to detect any biases introduced in the analysis because of a shift in 
the values of the market model parameters after the event, we have estimated 
α and β for the period t=+60 to t=+360 and no statistically significant shift 
has been observed. 
 
7   The bid premium is collected from Acquisitions Monthly and is calculated as 
follows: 
Bid Premium one month before the announcement = (Bid Price per 
Share/Share Price of the Target one Month before Announcement) 
Bid Premium one day before the announcement = (Bid Price per Share/Share 
Price of the Target one Day before Announcement) 
 
8 Hampel  Report,  Paragraph 3.14 (II Board Composition, A Balance), 1995. 
 
9  CGB=Total Loans (Debts)/(Equity Capital + Reserves – Total Intangibles) 
 